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Larry from the Left: An Appreciation 
 
Grant M. Hayden

 & Matthew T. Bodie
**
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Scholars live on through ideas.  And Larry Ribstein had ideas about law 
schools, firms, and markets that will live on long after him.  He spoke to the work 
through “Ideoblog,” a blog whose motto was: “A blog about ideas. Ideas are not 
beliefs or opinions.”1  It was a surprisingly esoteric motto for a writer not afraid to 
dole out harsh criticism.  But it captured something special about Ribstein: his 
attraction to the power of ideas.  He was not a sentimentalist, nor a yellow-dog 
Republican or Democrat.  He followed his scholarly and ideological principles 
and advocated ceaselessly for their implications.  
 
 One might expect a progressive paper on Larry’s legacy to focus on the 
importance of responding to his work in developing a compelling critique of 
conservative law-and-economics scholarship.  Something along the lines of: 
“Ribstein’s formidable development of the case for free-market libertarianism 
provides a useful whetting stone upon which to hone a new programme for 
economic equality.”  But that is not our approach.  Instead, our claim—a bolder 
one, but perhaps more tenuous—is that progressive corporate law scholars can 
and should find ideas for legal reform in Ribstein’s voluminous writings.  And 
this endeavor does not involve cherry-picking a passage here or a footnote there.  
Many of Ribstein’s most important ideas—his attack on the “nexus of contract” 
theory for public corporations and his idealized vision of small-c capitalism and 
the competition it engenders—provide support for a world that is more 
egalitarian, less protective of elites, and more robust in the economic 
opportunities that it offers.  His attacks on certain liberal tropes should lead not to 
                                                          

 Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. 
**
 Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A version of this paper was presented at the 
January 2013 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).  The authors 
thank Lyman Johnson for his commentary on the paper at AALS.  Part II of this Essay is based on 
our discussion of Larry Ribstein’s book, “The Rise of the Uncorporation,” in Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011). 
1
 This header appeared at Ribstein’s “Ideoblog” website.  Ideoblog, 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog, which is no longer active.  Ribstein later joined the Truth 
on the Market blog, and his posts from both that blog and his earlier Ideoblog are archived at that 
site.  Truth on the Market, at: http://truthonthemarket.com/author/larryer/.  
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an instinctual defense of those tropes, but rather a reexamination of their 
underlying premises.  In many situations, progressive scholars may conclude that 
Larry was right—or, at least, had ideas that would make the world a better place. 
 
   
 
II. Larry as Corporation Critic 
 
Because Larry Ribstein was an avowed contractarian, one would have 
expected him to agree with mainstream corporate law scholarship, which remains 
centered on the “nexus of contracts” approach.  And in fact, much of Ribstein’s 
writings accord with the view that corporate law should be structured so as to 
allow the individual players to create economic relationships on their own terms.  
He hated the increasingly regulatory approach of corporate law, taking 
particularly aim at the two big federal acts that had come along in the past 
decade.
2
  However, while many scholars thought that the federalization of 
corporate law was an unfortunate encrustation on the existing state-oriented 
approach, Ribstein seems to have begun to have doubts about the entire 
enterprise.  In other words, he had begun to doubt that the core premises of 
corporate law still longer held true. 
 
The “nexus of contracts” theory holds that the firm – and by extension the 
corporation – is merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships.3  In 
other words, the firm is a “legal fiction;” it is “not an individual” and has no real 
independent existence.
4
   Instead of thinking of the corporation as an independent 
entity, “nexus of contract” theory breaks it down into its component parts.5  These 
parts are the contractual relationships between the various parties involved with 
the firm: executives, directors, creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees.  
Thus, corporate law is an extension of contract law and should focus on 
                                                          
2
 HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE 
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Financial Reform That Isn’t, FORBES.COM, 
July 15, 2010, at: http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/08/financial-reform-bill-hedge-funds-opinions-
columnists-larry-e-ribstein.html. 
3
 Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).   
4
 Id. at 310-11. 
5
 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (defining the “nexus of contracts” approach as “the firm is a legal 
fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of 
production”). 
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facilitating the interrelationships between contractual participants in the most 
efficient manner.
6
 
 
The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential in shaping 
corporate law theory of the past three decades.
7
  But despite its dominance, there 
is still confusion over whether the theory is a descriptive model, a normative 
prescription, or some combination of both.
8
  Jensen and Meckling presented a 
positive theory of the corporation and its concomitant relationships.
9
  That thread 
has been picked up in the legal literature, with Easterbrook and Fischel cementing 
the concept in place.
10
  But even at the most basic of levels, the “corporation as 
contract” claim is simply incorrect.  Corporations are not creatures of contract.  
One cannot contract to form a corporation.
11
  The individuals involved must apply 
to a state for permission to create such an entity.  The fact that this permission is 
readily granted (as long as fees and taxes are paid) does not change the fact that 
permission is required.
12
  Moreover, the designation is legally meaningful.  As 
discussed further  below, putting a series of contractual relationships within a 
corporation changes those contractual relationships. 
 
                                                          
6
 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 
1444 (1989) 
7
 Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) (“Critics and advocates agree that 
a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in the last decade swept the legal theory of 
the corporation.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-
called nexus of contracts theory."); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics , 
18 J. CORP . L. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that "the nexus-of-contracts view of the modern 
corporation and the principal-agent explanation of some important aspects of the firm . . . have had 
profound implications for some of the most important issues of corporation law"). 
8
 Melvin Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual 
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999) (“Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse 
the positive proposition that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the 
normative proposition that the persons who constitute a corporation should be free to make 
whatever reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the constraints of any mandatory legal 
rules.”).   
9
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note JM, at 310-11. 
10
 Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006) (describing Easterbrook and Fischel as “the primary expositors of the 
contractarian theory”). 
11
 This fact is acknowledged by contractarian theorists.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate 
Contract, supra note EF2, at 1444-45 (acknowledging that statutory corporate law is necessary to 
create a corporation). 
12
 Cf. Bratton, supra note WB1, at 445 (“If the corporation really ‘is’ contract, as the new 
economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state interference should have withered 
away by now . . . .  But the sovereign presence persists.”). 
4 
 
The fallback position of contractarian scholars is that the nexus of 
contracts model is not a literal claim.
13
  But it’s often difficult to determine when 
the theory crosses the line from abstracting metaphor to description of reality.
14
  
To say that we should conceive of the firm as a nexus of contracts for certain 
purposes is different than saying that corporations actually are simply a nexus of 
contracts.
15
  Yet both characterizations are used seemingly interchangeably.
16
  
Moreover, contractarians often seek to minimize the role of the state to such a 
degree that it becomes vestigial.  Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, claim that 
when it comes to the corporation, “what is open to free choice is far more 
important to the daily operation of the firm, and investors’ welfare, than is what 
the law prescribes.”17  Corporate law thus becomes a way of facilitating the other 
aspects of the corporation – the more important, contractually-based ones.18 
                                                          
13
 Fred McChesney, for example, stated: “Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation 
codes and other sources of law contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around. 
. . . [T]o claim that contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse 
them of blindness or stupidity.”  Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the 
Corporate Field: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1530 (1989).  But it is 
sometimes difficult to parse the language of the theory to determine what is actually being 
claimed.  See Bainbridge, “Nexus,” supra note SB1, at 11 (“I have come around to the view that 
the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a literal sense, albeit a very limited one.”); Julian 
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 919 (“[A]lthough it may 
be technically accurate to describe a corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely 
inadequate.”). 
14
 It is difficult to measure the extent to which contractarians shift their metaphor into the realm of 
literal truth.  Certainly, most contractarians will admit that a corporation cannot be formed through 
contract.  However, the theory is often described in shorthand as a positive description. See, e.g., 
MACEY, supra note JM1, at 22 (“It has long been recognized . . . that the corporation . . . should be 
viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 
781 (2006) (“[I]t is commonplace and correct to say that the corporation is a nexus of contracts . . . 
.”). 
15
 For a discussion of the uses and misuses of models in corporate law theory, see G. Mitu Gulati, 
William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 889-93, 945-48 
(2000).  See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law, 4 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 273 (2005) (discussing the use of metaphors in corporate law). 
16
 Bill Bratton has described how Easterbrook and Fischel moved over time from a strong version 
of the theory to a weaker one.  William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-
Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 184 (1992) (“Easterbrook and Fischel are so 
astute that they keep a safe distance from the assertion that the corporation is a nexus of contracts. 
The book delimits and subordinates this once foundational proposition.”). 
17
 Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra note EF2, at 1418.  They continue: “For debt 
investors and employees, everything (literally) is open to contract; for equity investors, almost 
everything is open to choice.”  Easterbrook and Fischel assumedly are only speaking of state 
corporate law here, as there are significant regulations placed on debt and employment contracts. 
18
 As Easterbrook & Fischel state: 
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 Thus, contractarians have two competing sets of positive claims, with two 
sets of normative takeaways.
 19
  First, they argue that the corporation is primarily 
contractual, and as such it represents terms that the parties have freely chosen 
amongst themselves.  Since the terms have been freely chosen, we can presume 
they are efficient.
20
  This claim leads to the normative perspective that since the 
corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary agreements, corporate law 
should eschew mandatory rules.
21
  The second set of claims, however, suggests 
that corporate law does provide default or even mandatory terms in those 
situations where these terms are approximations of the will of the parties.
22
  These 
mandatory terms trump contractual freedoms, but they are designed so that the 
parties may more efficiently go about the rest of their business.  The concern for 
these mandatory terms is mitigated, because there is choice amongst the fifty 
states as to the laws of incorporation.
23
 
 
 Larry Ribstein was a contractarian.  Prior to his book The Rise of the 
Uncorporation, his work largely demonstrated agreement with the descriptive and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Why not just abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they 
please?  The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of 
terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of 
contracting.  There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing quorums and so 
on, that almost everyone will want to adopt.  Corporate codes and existing judicial 
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation, enabling the venturers to 
concentrate on matters specific to their undertaking. 
 
Id. at 1444. 
19
 Klausner, supra note MK1, at 783 (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both 
normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it ‘almost always’ 
does.”). 
20
 A more nuanced version of this would be: having the parties choose their terms is the system 
most likely to lead to an efficient result over time, as there is no other system likely to result in 
greater efficiency. 
21
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) ("The nexus of 
contracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious 
of which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 
1397 (1989) (noting that corporate law contractarians argue “that the contractual view of the 
corporation implies that the parties should be totally free to shape their contractual 
arrangements”). 
22
 MACEY, supra note JM1, at 22 (“[B]usiness law, including corporate law, exists to economize 
on transaction costs by supplying sensible ‘off-the-rack’ rules that participants in a business can 
use to economize on the costs of contracting.”). 
23
 See, e.g., ERIN E. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
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the normative aspects of the nexus of contracts theory.  His most direct discussion 
of the theory is “Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians,” an article he wrote with Henry Butler.24  Butler and Ribstein 
define contractarian theory as: “the corporation is a set of contracts among the 
participants in the business, including shareholders, managers, creditors, 
employees and others.”25  They argue that private ordering is the best way to 
arrange these relationships.
26
  Like Easterbrook and Fischel, however, they view 
state corporation law as an extension of the contract.
27
  And they are quick to 
move to the “policy implication” that “private parties to the corporate contract 
should be free to order their affairs in whatever manner they find appropriate.”28 
 
 “Opting Out” criticizes anticontractarians on both descriptive and 
normative grounds.  The authors point to the “demise” of concession theory, 
based on the notion that “[t]hroughout the nineteenth century, under the onslaught 
of increasingly permissive general incorporation statutes, state creation gradually 
yielded to private formation of the corporation and private ordering of the 
corporate relationship.” 29   They concede that “modern corporate statutes do 
include many mandatory terms, including voting rules, fiduciary duties and legal 
capital rules.”30 However, they argue that these mandatory terms are, in most 
cases, better characterized as some form of avoidable placeholder.  Some 
seemingly mandatory rules may be strong default rules that can nevertheless be 
contracted around.
31
  Other mandatory rules, such as shareholder voting on 
mergers, can be avoided by restructuring the underlying transaction.
32
  Moreover, 
parties can avoid the mandatory rules from a particular state by incorporating in 
another state or choosing another organizational form.
33
  They conclude: 
                                                          
24
 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians , 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).   
25
 Id. at 7.   
26
 Id. (“The corporate contract also specifies the extent to which the parties rely on the competitive 
pressures from capital, product, and managerial labor markets as well as internal incentive 
structures such as corporate hierarchy, boards of directors and managerial compensation contracts, 
to force agents to act in their shareholders' best interests.”).  Their focus, like Jensen and 
Meckling, is on agency costs. 
27
 Id. (“The terms of the agency contract include the provisions of state law, which are regarded as 
a standard form that can be accepted by the parties or rejected either by drafting around the 
provision or by incorporating in another state.”). 
28
 Id. at 7-8. 
29
 Id. at 9.   
30
 Id. at 10. 
31
 Id. (discussing the close-corporation buyout rules from Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)). 
32
 Id.  
33
 Id. at 11. 
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In sum, truly “mandatory”' provisions are the exception rather than 
the rule in the law of business associations. The most important 
mandatory provisions are the federal securities laws and state 
provisions that are imposed on existing investors in firms. While 
these provisions are not trivial, they do not establish the non-
contractual nature of the corporation.
34
 
 
 Interestingly, Butler and Ribstein also criticize Easterbrook and Fischel for 
not being sufficiently committed to the contractual model.  They argue that 
Easterbrook and Fischel use the concept of a “hypothetical bargain” to impose 
certain terms upon the corporate contract.
35
  Calling this approach “inconsistent 
with the contract theory of the corporation,” Butler and Ribstein contend that “it is 
one thing to propound a default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties' 
contract, and another thing to state a general rule applicable irrespective of 
contract.”36  A true contractualist, in their view, would favor a default approach, 
one that allowed parties to contract in accord with their preferences.
37
 
 
The debate between two sets of committed contractarians over the proper 
approach to the corporate rules is indicative of the nexus of contract theory’s 
unsettled state – drifting between reality and metaphor, description and normative 
judgment.
38
  In The Rise of the Uncorporation, however, Ribstein makes clear 
that the descriptive claim is no longer true.  The book tracks the developments of 
two broad types of business organization: the corporation (in both public and 
private forms) and the “uncorporation,” a collective term for a variety of 
partnership-like organizations, primarily partnerships and limited liability 
companies (LLCs).
39
  Ribstein tracks the history of these forms as two inversely-
related lines: uncorporations predominated up until the latter nineteenth century, 
at which point the corporation took off and achieved a century of dominance.  
Although the corporation remains the primary form of business organization, the 
uncorporation is catching up, constituting almost a third of all tax-reporting 
                                                          
34
 Id. at 11-12. 
35
 Id. at 16-17. 
36
 Id. at 17. 
37
 Id.  They discuss the example of management responses to hostile corporate takeovers.  
Easterbrook and Fischel support rules requiring management passivity, while Butler and Ribstein 
would impose default rules. 
38
 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note ME1, at 836 (finding that nexus of contract theory “can be understood 
in either a very weak or a very strong sense”).  
39
 Ribstein, Uncorporation, at 1. 
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business entities.
40
  As the title of the book suggests, the corporation is poised to 
plummet as the uncorporation begins its ascent. 
 
The Rise of the Uncorporation is a refutation of the descriptive part of the 
nexus of contracts theory, at least as applied to the twenty-first century 
corporation.  To be sure, Ribstein is committed to nexus of contract theory in its 
normative instantiation; he believes that individual participants in a business 
organization should be left free to construct that organization as they see fit.  But 
the new organizational hero for contractarians, in Ribstein’s telling, is the 
uncorporation.  The uncorporation, unlike pretenders before it, is actually 
something close to the pure nexus of contracts.  To make his case, Ribstein uses a 
foil, and that foil is the corporation. 
 
 On a fundamental level, corporations all share the same governance 
characteristics.  The firm is controlled by a board of directors, who in turn select 
the officers who run the day-to-day business of the operation.  This board is 
elected by shareholders.  The shareholders share in the profits of the corporation 
through dividends and can sell their shares on the open market.  This same basic 
structure – shareholders elect directors who appoint officers – can be found in 
every public corporation.
41
   
 
Why is this tripartite power dynamic so uniform across corporations?  Is it 
because corporate law requires this structure, or because this structure is the most 
efficient and therefore freely chosen?  Contractarians would point to the default 
nature of corporate law statutes as evidence that this structure is optimal.  For 
example, section 141 of Delaware General Corporation Law states: “The business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”42  Thus the board—
the central feature of corporate governance—appears to be merely a default rule.  
Similarly, the Model Business Corporation Act states that “[a]ll corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the 
corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to 
any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement 
                                                          
40
 Id. at 3. 
41
 The same is true of closely-held corporations, although the roles overlap to a great extent. 
42
 Del. Code tit. 8 § 141(a) (2010).   
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authorized under section 7.32.”43  Perhaps corporations could really be arranged 
in almost any possible fashion.
44
 
 
However, this apparent flexibility is belied by the actual structure of most 
corporations and the presence of other mandatory requirements.  In practice, for 
example, corporate charters are extremely homogenous.
45
  The diversity that one 
might expect from a collection of firms with heterogeneous governance needs is 
nowhere apparent.
46
  Moreover, the apparent flexibility of corporate law on paper 
is undercut by a more complex reality.  The textual openness of § 141(a), for 
example, masks a fairly rigorous defense of managerial power.  Shareholders’ 
power to amend the corporation’s bylaws under § 109(b) of the Code takes a back 
seat to the more free-ranging power of § 141(a).
47
  In addition, many aspects of 
federal securities law, particularly SEC Rule 14a-8
48
 and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act,
49
 assume the existence of the certain governance mechanisms, such as the 
board and shareholder meetings, before adding additional requirements.
50
  
 
Ribstein argues that centralized management is “[t]he feature that best 
characterizes the large-firm nature of the corporation,” and the board of directors 
is “one of the most distinctive features of the corporate form.”51  He contends that 
“only a corporation must have a board of directors that is separate from the 
executives and appointed directly by the owners.”52  Shareholder voting is part of 
the “legally mandated corporate governance structure;” it is so critical that it is 
                                                          
43
 MBCA § 8.01(b). 
44
 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in 
Public Relations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) (“Delaware law 
accordingly treats board governance as a default rule that can be ‘bargained around’ in the 
corporate charter.”). See generally Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“Even more than is commonly realized, virtually all of corporate law 
today consists of default rules rather than mandatory rules.”). 
45
 Klausner, supra note MK1, at 784, 786-91. 
46
 Id. at 783. 
47
 John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn 
Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1353 (2001) (“A bylaw is impermissible if its primary purpose 
is to prevent or interfere with the board’s discretion under section 141(a) to manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation . . . .”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and 
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 428–44 (1998). 
48
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2009). 
49
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
50
 For example, Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders the authority to propose actions to the board at the 
annual meeting, and Sarbanes-Oxley puts independence requirements on audit committees, which 
are subcommittees of the board.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 2003). 
51
 RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 67. 
52
 Id. 
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considered “sacred space.”53  In addition, Ribstein points to transferable shares, 
fiduciary duties, and capital lock-in as other essential “governance” elements of 
the corporation.
54
  Each of these is essentially required as part of the corporate 
form.
55
 
 
Ribstein does not spend a great deal of time defending his characterization 
of these corporate characteristics as mandatory.  This is a critical point, as some 
contractarians have depicted the modern corporation as the product of market 
forces rather than state law.
56
  It is somewhat surprising to see this article of 
contractarian faith being dismissed so cavalierly by a contractarian.  But the 
mandatory nature of these governance “requirements” is necessary for Ribstein to 
tell his political economy story.  Each of these factors, to a greater or lesser 
degree, plays a critical role in the government’s regulation of and control over the 
modern corporation. 
 
As Ribstein describes it, “[t]he corporate form represents a quid pro quo: 
big firms get corporate features, and government gets an opportunity to regulate 
governance.” 57   Thus, the board of directors is not just an efficient way of 
centralizing authority, as others have argued.
58
  It also plays a “politically 
legitimizing role” and has the opportunity to “help constrain corporations to act 
consistently with the objectives of lawmakers rather than solely those of 
investors.” 59   The shareholder meeting is “not simply a way to ensure that 
managers are running the firm in the shareholders’ interests, but also a mechanism 
for admitting vox populi into the running of these powerful institutions.”60  Given 
the power of large corporations for good and evil, Ribstein argues, lawmakers 
sought to introduce internal limitations on their governance.
61
   Of course, tax was 
an issue as well.  The corporate tax—characterized as “double taxation,” since 
dividends are taxed as well—was “in a sense a fee for incorporating.”62  All of 
these restrictions on corporate freedom can be traced back to regulatory motives. 
 
                                                          
53
 Id. at 69. 
54
 Id. at 68-75. 
55
 In an earlier piece, Ribstein (with Butler) argued that fiduciary duties were not outside of the 
realm of contract law and thus should not be counted as evidence of a noncontractarian approach.  
Butler & Ribstein, supra note BR1, at 28-32. 
56
 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note HH1, at 1-2. 
57
 RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 66. 
58
 Bainbridge, supra note SB1. 
59
 RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 68. 
60
 Id.at 70. 
61
 Id. at 86-87. 
62
 Id. at 99. 
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Given the corporate tax, as well as the regulation of corporate governance, 
why did the great majority of businesses choose the corporation as their 
organizational form?  Ribstein’s answer is, largely, the promise of limited 
liability.  The role of limited liability has long been a bête noire for contractarians, 
since it is clearly an aspect of the corporation that is not contractual.  Its 
importance has been minimized, overlooked, or disputed.  In Rise, however, 
Ribstein decisively argues that the corporation’s monopoly on limited liability 
was the key to its organizational popularity.   
 
Limited liability is the reason why the corporation succeeded where the 
partnership failed.  Discussing the characteristics that are specific to corporations, 
Ribstein notes that “partnerships long have been able to contract for such 
corporate-type features, with one critical exception – limited liability.”63  As he 
makes clear, limited liability is distinctly non-contractarian: “Limited liability is 
particularly important because, unlike other corporate features discussed above, 
partnerships could not easily contract for it without lawmakers’ cooperation as 
they have to include the creditors in these contracts.”64  Although he recognizes 
that there may have been (cumbersome) contractual methods for limiting liability 
for contractual claimants, it would have been “impossible” to secure limited 
liability against tort claimants without the government’s help.65   And limited 
liability is not window dressing.  As Ribstein concedes: “This feature is basic 
because . . . it is the one that parties cannot replicate by private contract.  
[W]hether a statutory form provides for limited liability therefore will dominate 
parties’ choice of form.”66 
 
 Control over liability is what gave lawmakers the upper hand in directing 
organizational choice.  It was the carrot that states used to get businesses into the 
corporate form.   
The tradeoff between limited liability, on the one hand, and the tax and regulatory 
treatment of the corporation, on the other, is critical to Ribstein’s political 
economy narrative: “As lawmakers could control access to limited liability, they 
could extract a quid pro quo for it by channeling limited liability firms into the 
corporate form and then taxing and regulating corporations.”67  The delay in the 
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Limited liability could not be considered a subsidy to firms to the extent that 
creditors adjust their credit charges for the greater risk.  Even to the extent that 
limited liability shifts risks to tort creditors who cannot demand compensation 
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development of the uncorporation stems from legislators’ desire to maintain the 
limited availability of this quid pro quo.  Ribstein contends: “Government has 
jealously guarded the prerogative of cresting limited liability and sought to 
channel limited liability into the regulated corporate form.”68 
 
The importance of limited liability is a theme Ribstein turns to over and 
over again in the book.
69
  For example, the closely-held corporation makes no 
sense to Ribstein as an organizational form, as it imposes a structure on small 
firms that is much more suitable to larger companies.
70
  In Ribstein’s view, 
“[c]losely held firms’ widespread use of the corporate form indicates that the 
benefits of limited liability outweighed firms’ costs of having to accept the other 
aspects of the corporate form along with it.”71  This basic equation started to shift, 
however, as tax reform in the 1980s made the corporate tax more onerous.  
Businesses started to push for organizational forms that avoided the corporate tax 
without many of the drawbacks of partnership.  For a time, the Kintner 
regulations
72
 drew the line as to which firms would be taxed as corporations.  
Because firms with limited liability were considered corporations, “the tax 
classification rules effectively forced firms to pay a tax to the federal government 
for complete limited liability” 73   However, as businesses grew increasingly 
dissatisfied with the strictures of the corporate form, pressure grew for an 
alternative.  The limited liability company, originally a modest vehicle for oil and 
gas companies, threaded the needle by getting classified as a partnership for tax 
purposes,
74
 despite having limited liability.
75
  This leak in the dam ultimately 
drove the IRS to adopt a “check the box” rule allowing firms to choose whether 
                                                                                                                                                              
for the additional risk, society arguably gains because investors are attracted to 
socially productive ventures.  However, it is not clear why limited liability firms 
should “pay” for this social benefit by being subjected to extra constraints on 
their operations.   
Id. at 79-80. 
68
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they wanted to be taxed as partnerships or corporations.
76
  “Check the box” 
opened the door for the full flowering of the “uncorporation,” as limited liability 
was allowed to coexist with favorable tax treatment. 
 
Ribstein tells a story of contractual desires ultimately breaking free of a 
regulatory scheme that sought to channel businesses into one particular form.  
Certainly one could tell a different story: the story of how the corporation 
carefully balanced costs and benefits amongst businesses and society until interest 
groups finally succeeded in cracking the tax code.  This is not Ribstein’s 
narrative, but it is consistent with his version of events.  More importantly, both 
stories emphasize the importance of the government and of organizational law to 
the choice of organizational form.  The corporation is not simply a nexus of 
contracts.  It is an organizational form with a set of state-given benefits (primarily 
limited liability) along with a set of taxes and mandatory governance rules.  The 
state plays a much larger role in the story than contractarians have ever before 
allowed. 
 
Ribstein’s uncorporation seems to be the undoing for the nexus of 
contracts theory, at least as a positive description.  The corporation is not simply a 
point at which myriad contracts intersect.  It is instead a governmentally-created 
organizational body that imposes specific constraints on participants.  Conceiving 
of the corporation as a simple agglomeration of private agreements—even 
metaphorically—is deeply misleading.  As the uncorporation demonstrates, the 
corporation has many specific features that could be considered either mandatory 
or quasi-mandatory.  These features distinguish the corporation not only from the 
realm of contract but from the uncorporation as well. 
 
A contractarian might, at this point, turn the diversity in organizational 
choice around on us and argue that the variety demonstrates a different kind of 
contractual freedom.  After all, as Ribstein argues, having a multitude of 
organizational choices allows parties to pick and choose the organizational form 
that best suits their needs.
77
  Businesses are no longer stuck with the corporation; 
they are now free to choose any of the variety of uncorporations instead.  Because 
parties are still using the corporation, even in the midst of organizational 
plenitude, that must mean that parties prefer the corporation.  It is the choice of 
the majority of businesses; it must therefore have advantages that other 
organizational forms do not.  In other words, we can say that the corporation is 
like a nexus of contracts, in that it is freely chosen by the parties as the best 
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organizational delivery system for their relationships.  Even if not literally a 
contractual nodule, it represents the parties’ free choice.78   
 
 This is not the argument Ribstein makes in Rise.  He argues instead that 
the uncorporation is a superior vehicle for addressing the problems of 
contemporary organizational structure.
79
  Arguing that the corporation is “far 
from ideal” as a governance structure, Ribstein claims that “the uncorporation 
provides potentially more efficient ways to control the agency costs of centralized 
management.”80   He argues that the traditional corporate tools for restraining 
managers—shareholder voting, boards of directors, fiduciary duties, and 
takeovers—have failed to provide the proper market discipline.81  Instead, the 
uncorporation’s combination of greater managerial freedom and stronger mandate 
for distributions provide a better approach, in his view, for reducing managerial 
costs.
82
  
 
If the uncorporation is a superior organizational form, why is it only 
gaining popularity now?  Ribstein provides only a brief direct answer, citing the 
increased salience of agency costs, greater financial complexity, and advances in 
organizational development.
83
  His narrative, however, describes how the 
uncorporation has only recently been freed of its regulatory shackles, with “check 
the box” allowing uncorporations both favorable tax treatment and limited 
liability.  It is state lawmakers and federal bureaucrats who created the LLC 
revolution.  Political forces entrenched the corporation; now those forces have 
created an opening for the uncorporation.
84
  To the extent the uncorporation does 
face challenges to its growing role, Ribstein sees those challenges largely coming 
from the government.
85
  This is not a story of firms adapting to organizational 
demands through contract.  It is a story of government facilitating growth (or not) 
through the organizational forms it provides: 
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The large uncorporation’s story is still unfolding.  Courts, 
regulators, and tax authorities may decide that large firms should 
be subject to corporate rules whatever business form they have 
chosen.  On the other hand, policy makers may see that the crisis in 
the governance of large firms demands a fresh approach rather than 
just tinkering with an increasingly unsatisfactory model. 
Understanding the distinct mechanisms of uncorporations and 
giving them room to operate may be a key to this fresh approach.
86
 
 
In other words, it is up to government to develop the organizational forms 
necessary for efficient private ordering. 
 
It is hard to know, at this point in time, how controversial such a statement 
is.  Law and economics scholars such as Henry Hansmann and Michael Klausner 
have moved away from the descriptive form of the nexus of contracts theory by 
suggesting that government does need to play a role in creating the corporate 
“contract.”87  Easterbrook and Fischel have touted a hypothetical bargain to be 
used contemporaneously with the actual bargain of the parties.
88
  And, of course, 
noncontractarians have long believed in the importance of government regulation 
to the nature of the firm.
89
  Ribstein’s approach is in many ways unremarkable.  
But it signals that, to the extent there was a debate about the positive version of 
nexus of contracts theory, the debate is over. 
 
 
III.  Larry as Economic Liberator 
 
 Of course, it is Ribstein’s normative commitment to contractarianism that 
draws him to the uncorporation in the first place.  The uncorporation offers the 
contractual flexibility that the corporation lacks.  Indeed, “uncorporation” itself is 
merely a label put on a variety of different organizational forms that offer an 
assortment of organizational approaches.  The flexibility represented by these 
forms, both internally and as a group, allows for greater specialization and even 
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“idiosyncratic arrangements.”90 For example, when it comes to fiduciary duties, 
Ribstein notes that Delaware corporate shareholders cannot waive the duties of 
loyalty and good faith, whereas that state offers much more flexibility on that 
score for limited partnerships and LLCs.
91
  Some of this flexibility can be put to 
very specific use.  Ribstein advocates that business association owners have 
stronger access to the firm’s cash on hand, through distributions or the power to 
demand liquidation or buyout.
92
  This access, in his view, would provide much 
greater market discipline against the managerial agency costs that have plagued 
the public corporation in the last decade.
93
 
 
However, Ribstein acknowledges that all is not completely contractual, 
not even in the uncorporate world.  Uncorporations have adopted the partnership 
approach of restricting transferability of management rights.
94
  Most LLCs 
statutes do not provide for a default right to disassociate, in order to accommodate 
tax law requirements about the liquidity of estate assets.
95
  And although LLCs 
have more flexible governance requirements than corporations, most statutes 
provide only a “binary choice between manager- and member-management.”96 In 
addition, standardization may be appropriate “to clarify the expectations of the 
many people with which the corporation deals.”97  Despite his admiration for 
Delaware’s freedom to waive such duties, Ribstein acknowledges that “[a]s LLCs 
increasingly become the new default entity, many undoubtedly are being formed 
with plain-vanilla certificates and no detailed arrangements.” 98   As a result, 
restrictions on waivers in other states’ LLC statutes may make sense as long as 
Delaware remains an option for sophisticated LLCs.  Ribstein argues: “This 
illustrates how distinctiveness can be as important among different statutory 
versions of the same business associations as it is among different types of 
business associations.”99 
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 Rather than minimizing the role of government in the uncorporation, 
Ribstein’s analysis highlights it.  Rise is rife with discussions of the inefficiencies 
of legislative drafting,
100
 the importance of tax policies such as the Kintner factors 
and “check the box,”101 and regulatory arbitrage.102 One is constantly reminded of 
the heavy hand of the state in creating corporations and uncorporations, in all their 
permutations.  This approach suits Ribstein’s normative agenda, which is to 
identify and eliminate market impurities introduced by legislative meddling.
103
  
But in his criticism of government, he must not only acknowledge that they 
sometimes get it right (LLCs, check-the-box), but also that the state holds the 
cards and controls the game.  Entities are state creations—a fact made abundantly 
clear. 
 
 At the end of the book, Ribstein cites the possibility of the un-business 
association – the “fully customized firm.”104 Although he doesn’t frame it exactly 
this way, one gets the sense the un-business-association would be Ribstein’s ideal 
when it comes to organizational forms.  Of course, at least one non-contractual 
element would still be necessary.  As Ribstein describes it, an un-business 
association statute would allow parties to “enter into a customized contract, but 
still have limited liability—a sort of ‘contractual entity.’” 105    Is this 
organizational form our future?  Or are we destined to have no organizational 
forms at all – only contracts?  
 
 At this moment, the long-term future of corporations seems potentially 
suspect.  As Ribstein has well documented, the corporation is under siege by this 
plethora of new organizational structures.  When the Treasury moved to “check-
the-box” taxation for these new entities, they became viable alternatives to the 
corporation in a variety of different fields. The flexibility of the LLC form is in 
contrast to many of the requirements, state and federal, placed upon the 
                                                                                                                                                              
organizational structures” and thus “can assume an almost unlimited variety of forms”).  He notes 
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corporation.
106
   It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen & Meckling’s “nexus of contracts” 
model is coming to life in the LLC, and the corporation’s failure to live up to their 
model is bringing it down. 
 
 The employment relation  seems to be moving from firm to market as 
well.  In the mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified internal labor 
markets as a deviation from neoclassical labor market theory.
107
  These 
economists found that employees largely stayed within one firm for their lifetime 
of employment, and that firms generally used internal promotion to fill vacancies.  
These findings established an empirical basis for Coase’s notion of the 
importance of the employment relation to the firm.  Moreover, internal labor 
markets are an instantiation of the separateness of the firm from the market; they 
demonstrate that the firm is truly a different set of relationships.  However, 
economists are finding that the importance of internal labor markets has been 
dwindling.    
 
 Beginning in the 1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and 
contingent workers.
108
  This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and continues 
apace.  Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned many 
employees into “permanent” temporary workers, with as much as 26 percent of 
the workforce now having “nonstandard” jobs.109  And the effects go beyond low-
skill and low-wage employment; executive officers, lawyers, and scientists are all 
among the temporarily employed.
110
  Moreover, “outsourcing” – a word of 
relatively recent vintage – continues to break down relationships that were 
traditionally within the firm.
111
  What Alan Hyde said in 1998 continues to be true 
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today: “Increasingly, labor is hired through short-term, market-mediated 
arrangements that may not be ‘employment’ relations in any legal or technical 
sense of that word.”112  
 
 During this new millennium, commentators have further analyzed the 
dissolution of the traditional employment relationship.
113
  The breakdown in 
internal labor markets has occurred mainly with respect to workers on either end 
of the skill spectrum.  Low-skilled workers find themselves in at-will employment 
contracts, which leave them exposed to outsourcing or replacement by other 
temporary workers.
114
  Highly skilled workers are also less likely to be captured 
by internal labor markets as they are able to leverage their skills in the 
marketplace to move from project to project, employer to employer.
115
    Internal 
labor markets have continued to dissolve as medium-skilled workers acquire 
fewer firm-specific firms, move between firms more frequently, and do so with 
more portable benefits at their disposal (especially defined contribution plans like 
401k’s). 116   As Kathy Stone has argued, “Work has become contingent, not 
merely in the sense that it is formally defined as short-term or episodic, but in the 
sense that the attachment between the firm and the worker has been weakened.”117  
 
 If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually-oriented form of 
business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dissolving back into the 
market, then perhaps corporations (or their successor organizational forms) will 
exist only to structure financial relationships and confer limited liability.  What 
would corporate law look like?  What would employment law look like?  The 
possibility of a radically individualized future is not necessarily a nightmare for 
progressive thinkers.   
 
 As low- and highly-skilled workers move out of internal labor markets 
into external ones, one could imagine a variety of ways that they may come 
together for mutual benefit.  In some cases, this may take place on a relatively 
small scale.  For example, there is already some indication of a move to smaller, 
more localized production in agriculture, as well as specialty foods like craft beer, 
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smoked meats, and artisanal cheese.
118
  These small-bore firms promote greater 
attention to detail and provide broader consumer choice.  They may also 
encourage greater freedom of movement within one’s career.  Smaller 
agglomerations of individual workers who move from project to project, rather 
than from firm to firm, may allow greater independence, and may provide 
workers with greater bargaining power.  The death of the massive public 
corporation may engender a Jeffersonian-style renaissance of small producers and 
greater attention to quality. 
 
Of course, greater worker participation in the management of business 
firms wouldn’t necessarily have to be limited to small-scale ventures.  Workers 
may, on a broad scale, enter into contracts that involve much more than the simple 
exchange of labor for wages.  In employee cooperatives, for example, workers 
also have economic and managerial interests in the enterprise.
119
 Each worker-
member in such a cooperative has input into the day-to-day and long term 
decisionmaking of the firm on a one worker, one vote basis.
120
  For larger 
cooperatives, this power is exercised in the ability to elect members of a 
governing board.
121
  Worker-members share in both the decisionmaking and 
profits.
122
  
 
 Employee cooperatives of this sort have already been successfully 
established on large scales in agricultural settings.  The plywood cooperatives in 
the Pacific Northwest are a well-studied example.
123
 More recently, the Tata 
Group in India established a cooperative as part of a strategy of divesting itself of 
a subsidiary, the Tetley Tea Company, which it had acquired for $450 million in 
2000.
124
  Instead of selling its agricultural plots to rich landowners or other 
corporations, Tata sold a majority of them to former employees of the company 
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and established a cooperative that was eventually known as the Kenan Devan 
Hills Plantation Company (KDHP).
125
 The cooperative has place great emphasis 
on outreach activities that involve health and education programs for their 
workers and their communities.
126
  KDHP now employs over 12,000 workers, 
most of whom are also shareholders, and has become the largest tea company in 
South India.
127
 
 
 Although employee cooperatives have traditionally been concentrated in 
agricultural or other  rural industries, the rise of the internet may facilitate 
expansion of this particular business form.
128
  As an initial matter, workers 
interested in such a venture may find information and guidance on this type of 
organizational structure more readily on the internet than otherwise possible.  But, 
more directly, the internet may allow like-minded workers separated by great 
distances come together into a cooperative without the imposition of the type of 
physical facilities and middle-management superstructure usually associated with 
such ventures.  And, more generally, the flexibility fostered by internet may 
facilitate all sorts of productive combinations of workers. 
 
 Thus, workers, freed from traditional contractual norms associated with 
internal labor markets, may thus come together in different ways, large and small.  
Employee cooperatives give workers a role in decisionmaking and a share of the 
profits.  Other institutional structures offer variations on those themes.  German-
style codetermination, for example, gives workers some decisionmaking authority 
through its works councils, but no real access to the profits.
129
 Employee stock 
ownership plans do the opposite—workers are entitled to a share of the firm’s 
profits but have no real access to the decisionmaking process.
130
  And though 
Ribstein didn’t spend as much time contemplating the role of the worker in most 
of his work on uncorporations, access to these types of organizational structures 
are clearly within the individual orderings contemplated by his broad commitment 
to contractarianism.       
 
                                                          
125
 See id. 
126
 See Corporate Social Responsibility, KDHP, http://www.kdhptea.com/Welfare.html 
127
 See Company Profile, KDHP, http://www.kdhptea.com/CompanyProfile.html 
128
 See Meredith-Anne Kurz, The Merits of Cooperative Corporate Governance in the Digital Age 
(unpublished manuscript). 
129
See Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, 
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); 
Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business 
Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975, 990-91 (1999). 
130
 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 105 (1996). 
22 
 
 Although internal labor markets aren’t expected to disappear anytime 
soon, they, too, may move in the direction of greater contractual diversity.  There 
is already evidence that workers are engaging with external markets on a number 
of fronts.  Greater labor mobility, fewer firm-specific skills, and portable benefits 
have already been mentioned.  But there are a number of other ways in which the 
traditional parties to a corporation might move toward greater worker 
independence.  While unions may continue to engage in their core functions of 
negotiating and monitoring compliance with collective bargaining agreements, 
workers may also contract with other union-like institutions that maintain varying 
degrees of independence from employers.
131
  Some of those institutions may 
move closer to employers, and engage both managers and workers in a 
consultative role.
132
  Others may function more in the capacity of service 
providers, completely disengaged from employers, and furnish workers with such 
things as legal advice or opportunities for professional development.
133
  For 
example, the Freelancers’ Union provides affordable health insurance and access 
to a health clinic with yoga classes and other services.
134
  As the Union’s founder 
has argued, “If Gompers were alive today, he’d be trying to figure out what the 
next models are for today’s workers.”135  Labor, just like capital in Ribstein’s 
vision of uncorporations, may begin to organize itself in a greater variety of 
contractual arrangements.   
 
 While some of these changes may be under the control of the parties, 
others may demand removal of some of the legal obstacles to free contracting.  
Traditional unions could be freed up to bargain on such things that are currently 
either illegal—such as hot cargo clauses136—or strongly discouraged—such as 
employee representation on corporate boards.
137
   We could eliminate state “right 
to work” laws, which prohibit unions and employers from freely bargaining for 
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union security arrangements.
138
  The creation of some of the quasi-union 
organizations may also require some legal changes, such as lifting the ban on 
prehire agreements
139
 or relaxing the rules on employer support of such employee 
organizations.
140
  These, and other changes set out in what what Samuel 
Estreicher terms a “freedom of contract” agenda,141 may increase the number of 
possible arrangements open to workers.   
 
 There may also be ways to enhance the contractual possibilities of those 
workers who remain in internal labor markets.  Although such workers, by 
definition, move between firms relatively infrequently, those moves still occur 
(and are, perhaps, more significant given their rarity).  These workers also move 
within firms as they are promoted, demoted, or transferred.  At all of these 
junctures, workers are faced with new contractual opportunities, however limited, 
and would benefit from more information.  One can imagine that organizations 
could arise to provide that information about things such as a potential new firm’s 
behavior in the past with respect to its workers; a current or new firm’s market 
position; and wage and benefit data for comparable positions in the industry.  
Armed with this kind of information, workers may be able to alter certain aspects 
of their new employment contracts or, even in take-it-or-leave-it situations, make 
better informed decisions.   
 
 Enhancing the contractual opportunities available to workers does have 
some distinct advantages.   Workers with better information may be able to tailor 
contracts to better fit their personal situations.  This may not only lead to better 
contracts, but the sense of control over one’s worklife which would itself 
contribute to a worker’s sense of well-being.  And such positive engagement with 
the employer would be beneficial to all corporate constituents. 
 
 There may be other advantages of moving toward a more contractarian 
regime for workers.  With more freedom to contract, one would expect workers to 
enter into an increasingly diverse set of agreements that detail their relationships 
with other constituents.  This, in turn, may begin to break down the traditional 
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distinctions between owners, managers, and workers.  This is certainly true, by 
definition, when it comes to the various forms of employee-owned or –managed 
enterprises discussed above.  But a blurring of roles may also take place in more 
traditional corporations as workers, alone or in groups, begin to structure 
contracts that involve more of what are usually considered ownership or 
management rights. 
 
 Allowing workers to restructure their relationships with each other and 
with other corporate constituents is certainly consistent with Ribstein’s 
contractarian impulses and his development of the uncorporation.  Workers, like 
other corporate constituents, should be able to move beyond their traditional roles 
and create contractual relationships that more fully satisfy their individual 
preferences.  This could be accomplished by altering some of the existing legal 
structures governing their relationships with other firm constituents, much as 
uncorporations undo many of the legal strictures of corporations.   
 
 Changing the legal restrictions and defaults with respect to employees is 
one thing.  But one wouldn’t have to go this far.  Some good could come by 
merely having workers (and other firm participants) act in new capacities.  
Getting past the old categories would allow better expression of a full range of 
people’s preferences.  Under existing norms, corporate constituents tend to act on 
preferences consistent with their roles in the corporation.  At a very general level, 
people acting in market contexts tend to focus on bottom-line considerations to 
the exclusion of other preferences.
142
  And, more specifically, shareholders 
attempt to maximize profit; consumers attend to focus on price and product 
quality.
143
  Non-market values—things like the social values of the corporation, 
its treatment of workers, environmental impacts—fall by the wayside.  Markets 
then, are hegemonic—people act for personal gain and other values are reflected 
in what they do with that gain.
144
 
 
 This is curious, however, because we know from a wide range of research 
that people possess and act upon other-regarding preferences in non-market 
contexts.
145
 So what accounts for the apparent on-again, off-again nature of 
people’s preferences?  As we’ve argued elsewhere, one possibility is that people 
do not consult their entire set of preferences when making decisions; instead, they 
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rely upon a proper subset of their interests.
146
  Different contexts (e.g., market 
versus non-market) and different roles may focus attention of different sets of 
preferences.  “Just as looking at a glass of cold water may focus one’s attention on 
his thirst, staring at a prospectus may make one focus on a corporation’s 
profitability.”147  Other preferences, even strongly held ones, may stay “offline” in 
such situations.   
 
 Thus, enhancing the contractual freedom of workers and other constituents 
may ultimately allow them to act in ways that maximize the full range of their 
preferences.  Workers could begin to think more like owners, and vice versa.  And 
such a state of affairs would complete the dream of any contractarian: to ensure 
that markets reflected people’s preferences rather than the other way around. 
 At least, we should not reject this possibility.  Larry Ribstein’s world is 
one of greater economic freedom.  Liberals have come to regard economic 
freedom reflexively as promoting a winner-take-all state in which the vast 
majority of workers are oppressed by capital.  But it would not necessarily turn 
out that way.  The communist state is less “progressive” than an unrestrained 
capitalist state would be, and economic freedom can promote personal freedom.  
Progressives should take Ribstein’s challenge of promoting greater economic 
flexibility as a way of promoting human flourishing.  To the extent some people 
would flail and fail under such a system, progressive should envision social 
structures that would provide support.  But these structures need not be a massive 
regulatory state.  Small-bore structures – micro-lending, employee ownership, 
unions or trade groups that offer insurance and support – can help individuals 
achieve success without the bureaucratic structures of a massive welfare state.  It 
may turn out that Ribstein’s world would look more like a 19th-Century English 
industrial town than it would the buzzing, whizzing world of dynamic contractual 
invention.  But progressive should not assume such a scenario—not when there 
are possibilities to explore. 
 
 The tide may be turning back to a more employee-oriented workplace.  
Popular management literature emphasizes the importance of the employee.
148
  
Small startups, particularly in the tech industry, are once again blurring the line 
between entrepreneur and employee.
149
  Academia is evolving, as well.  Recent 
research into the theory of the firm has focused on the importance of knowledge-
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based assets and the distribution of access top those assets within the firm.
150
  As 
we learn more about the importance of trust, norms, and procedural justice within 
the corporation, employees will grow even more in importance.
151
   
 
 It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which each 
worker is a “corporation” unto herself and firms are merely temporary 
agglomerations within the global market.  It is also possible to envision a future in 
which employees participate at the highest levels of governance, and corporations 
are tools of team production rather than investor enrichment.  Perhaps both of 
these futures are in store, to varying degrees within different industries.  Ribstein 
has encouraged us to envision a decentralized, contractual future.  Progressives 
should take him up on it. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: Living in Larry’s Future 
 
 Larry Ribstein envisions a world that is not for the faint-hearted or 
ignorant.  It requires workers to look for the best use of their talents, and to enter 
economic relationships that match best with their preferences and opportunities.  
It is a world shorn of bureaucracy, but also shorn of standard forms.  It eschews 
bailouts and cronyism.
152
 It also asks us to keep on our toes, lest we fall behind or 
be taken advantage of. 
 
 Progressives will want to look to the losers under such a system, and ask 
about their fate.  The safety net should be strong.
153
  But at the same time, 
progressives do not want to find themselves defending the “crony” capitalists, the 
bureaucrats, the defenders of the status quo.  A world of contractual freedom 
offers tremendous opportunity for individuals to pursue their talents without the 
encrustation of societal red tape or past practices to encumber them.   
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A lot is riding, though, on how those contracts are constructed.  It is not 
surprising, then, that Ribstein’s world has a significant and creative role for 
attorneys.  In his article on legal education reform, Ribstein describes lawyers as 
collaborators, manufacturers, lawmakers, information engineers, and 
capitalists.
154
  Constructing legal relationships in a variety of settings allows 
attorneys to be much more influential in unlocking value within the economy.  In 
fact, the level of legal knowledge amongst all economic participants would need a 
significant boost for participants to take full advantage of their economic freedom.  
Lawyers and law schools could play an important role in this new economy—a 
role that legal education has really yet to explore. 
 
This essay has taken an optimistic, perhaps even Panglossian perspective 
on the world of contractual freedom envisioned by Larry Ribstein.  But we think 
it is appropriate to do so, if only to get us started.  Sticking with the tried-and-true 
always seems safer.  It was Larry’s hope that he could push us off of that secure 
station, into an unknown but potentially limitless future. 
                                                          
154
 Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 1649, 1666-70 (2011). 
